Graph Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles by Duguid, CJ
This is an author produced version of Graph Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/106130/
Article:
Duguid, CJ (2016) Graph Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles. Dialectica, 70 (3). pp. 
463-474. ISSN 0012-2017 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12151
(c) 2016 The Author dialectica (c) 2016 Editorial Board of dialectica. This is the peer 
reviewed version of the following article: Duguid, CJ (2016) Graph Theory and the Identity 
of Indiscernibles. Dialectica, 70 (3). pp. 463-474. ISSN 0012-2017 , which has been 
published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12151 . This article may be 
used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for 
Self-Archiving. 
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
  
Graph Theory and The Identity of Indiscernibles 
Callum DUGUID 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The mathematical field of graph theory has recently been used to provide counterexamples to 
the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In response to this, it has been argued that 
appeal to relations between graphs allows the Principle to survive the counterexamples. In this 
paper, I aim to show why that proposal does not succeed. 
 
1. The PII 
 
The perennial issue of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles has recently been under attack 
from the mathematical domain. More specifically, it has been claimed that counterexamples to it 
can be found in graph theory. A response to this, focussing on relations found between graphs, 
rather than within them, has also been offered. In this essay I aim to show why the latter position 
faces a problem in its details. 
 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) states that any two objects which share 
all of their (suitably restricted) properties are identical. That is, indiscernibles must be identical. In 
the commonly given contrapositive form, the PII states that any two distinct objects must be 
discernible in a relevant respect. As is well known, allowing any property to discern two objects 
renders the principle trivial: for any x, take the property of being identical to x. 
 For the PII to be considered interesting, it is therefore necessary to restrict the range of 
properties that are permitted to discern objects. This is normally done by appeal to the notion of 
qualitative properties. However, this term is not obviously applicable to the mathematical properties 
that we will be considering. Further, different authors often take it to enforce additional constraints 
on which properties are permissible beyond merely ruling out those which trivialise the PII. For 
these reasons, I prefer to avoid referring to permissible properties as qualitative ones. 
One way of approaching the constraint on properties is given by Ladyman, Linnebo and 
PettigrewZKRILQGWKHXVXDOWDONRIµTXDOLWDWLYH¶DPELJXRXVDQGRIIHUWZRZD\VLQZKLFKLWFDQEH 
understood (2012). Call a property 'identity-involving' if its proper analysis involves the identity 
relation. Call a property 'object-involving' if its proper analysis makes appeal to particular objects. 
An immediately appealing way of deciding which properties are not permitted is to rule out 
identity-involving ones due to standard worries that these will prevent the PII from being a principle 
that reduces identity facts to non-identity facts. As haecceities, those properties that hold of only a 
single specific object, require both object names and the identity relation in their analysis, we might 
then permit object-involving properties to feature in the PII. 
Unfortunately, permissibility of properties cuts across the object-involving and identity-
involving distinctions. A ban on identity-involving properties would rule out superlative properties 
(and more generally, any property that expresses uniqueness). Yet properties like being the brightest 
star look like they express genuine differences between objects without trivialising the PII. 
Similarly, object-involving properties like being the daughter of x also express difference while not 
entailing that every object must therefore be discernible. 
A more fruitful route of making the distinction ± as far as this paper goes ± is given by 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Let us define a property as being impermissible iff differing with respect 
to it is or may be differing numerically. That is, a trivialising property expresses only that the object 
which bears it is distinct. 
As a consequence of this, we cannot say that the resulting PII is a reductive principle. Since 
there are non-trivialising properties which are also identity-involving, demonstrating that the PII 
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holds for some domain does not suffice to show that the relevant identity facts are reducible to facts 
that do not involve identity. This may conflict with the motivation that some people have for 
accepting the principle. This is unfortunate, but it is the aim of this paper to show that even this 
weakened form does not hold in all domains. If successful, this entails that more motivated, stronger 
forms will fail as well. 
 Since the terminology commonly used in these debates is often taken to have subtly different 
meanings depending on the particular author, it will be helpful to be clear about which set of 
definitions I intend to work with. Those that I favour are given in a paper by Caulton and 
Butterfield (2012). In the Frege-Quine tradition, an 'object' is simply something which could be the 
referent of a singular term. When we have a formula that can be applied to one object and not 
another, we say the two objects are 'discernible'. 
 Saunders's revival of Quine¶s grades of discriminability reminded metaphysicians that 
discernibility can be found in varying degrees.1 In order of least-discerning to most-discerning, 
Caulton and Butterfield distinguish intrinsic, absolute, relative and weak discernibility. This paper 
will only need to focus on two of these: absolute and weak discernibility. We say that two objects 
are absolutely discernible if there is some 1-place formula which applies to one of the objects and 
not the other. We say that two objects are weakly discernible if there is some 2-place formula that is 
satisfied by the objects as a pair but is not satisfied by either object taken with itself. 
 Under the reasonable assumption that the language we are working in is expressively 
adequate (that is, each formula in the language corresponds to some property and each property 
corresponds to some formula), the following two definitions are equivalent to the previous ones. 
Two objects are absolutely discernible if there is some property that one has but the other does not. 
Two objects are weakly discernible is there is some relation between the objects that neither object 
bears to itself. 
 If the discernibility that the PII is concerned with is taken to be absolute discernibility alone, 
then there is a plethora of counterexamples available to it. These come from several areas, such as: 
philosophical imagination, as in the case of Black's spheres (Black, 1952); physics, which gives us 
fermions and bosons; and mathematics, which presents the complex conjugates i and -i. In all three 
cases, there are two objects that appear to have all of the same properties and relations. Hence any 
defender of the PII must allow take the relevant discernibility to be more discerning. As the most 
discerning form is weak discernibility, it is this form of the PII that I am interested in. 
 Earlier it was claimed that we do not need to ban object-involving properties from featuring 
in the PII since they are not all trivialising. However, we may wish to heed the warning of Muller 
(2015), who bans such properties on account of them often being used in an illegitimate way.2 With 
this tripartite distinction of discernibility in hand we are now in a position to do just that. By 
Ladyman, Linnebo and PettLJUHZ¶V 7KHRUHP  DQ\ IRUP RI GLVFHUQLELOLW\ LQ D ODQJXDJH ZLWK
object names available is equivalent to weak discernibility in a language without such names 
(Ladyman, Linnebo and Pettigrew, 2012, 172-173). In other words, adding properties that use object 
names will not discern any more objects than weak discernibility already does. 
 There is a practical benefit to making this move. While any trivialising object-involving 
properties ought to be ruled out by our impermissibility definition, exactly what counts as 
trivialising in the mathematical domain is not an easy matter. It is possible for impermissible 
properties to mistakenly get categorised as permissible via human error; following Muller in 
banning object-involving properties reduces the chances of this. While this may result in some 
acceptable properties being ignored, we know that there will be a weakly discerning relation 
available to discern the relevant objects. 
 As a consequence of the above discussion, haecceitistic properties, like being identical to b, 
will be counted as impermissible on two counts. Not only are they trivialising in the sense 
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mentioned previously, they are also object-involving. In the context of graph theory, which will be 
the focus of this article, properties like being adjacent to b will also be ruled out: while not 
trivialising, they are object-involving. However, those that make no reference to vertex names, like 
being adjacent to 3 distinct vertices will be counted as permissible.3 
 Introducing weak discernibility allows the PII to survive the traditional counterexamples 
noted above as the objects in each can be weakly discerned. For example, in the case of Black's 
spheres, one is a mile apart from the other, but not a mile apart from itself. However, even the 
weaker form of the PII does not hold in all contexts. In particular, it has recently come under attack 
in the mathematical domain, where it is claimed that there exist graph-theoretic counterexamples.4 
In the remainder of this paper, I will first explain exactly what these counterexamples are, and why 
the revised form of the PII cannot accommodate them. I shall then introduce De Clercq's (2012) 
defence of the principle. The discussion will then turn to a problem with this defence, concluding 
that the PII does not hold in the mathematical domain in general. 
 
2. Graph Theory 
 
The basic idea behind the graph theoretic counterexamples is that graph theorists assume the 
distinctness of certain mathematical objects, but we can find no relation between the objects that 
discerns them. Hence either graph theorists are mistaken or the PII does not hold in graph theory. I 
will be assuming what Shapiro calls the faitKIXOQHVVFRQVWUDLQWZHDLPWRµprovide an interpretation 
that takes as much as possible of what mathematicians say about their subject as literally true¶ 
(2008, 289). On that basis the above conflict gives us reason to conclude that even the weak form of 
PII does not hold in graph theory. 
 To begin the discussion proper, we will need to first introduce a small amount of graph 
theory. In what follows, definitions of graph-theoretic terms are taken from Bondy and Murty 
(2007) and Diestel (2010). 
 A graph G is an ordered pair (V, E), where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of edges. 
Members of E are unordered pairs of vertices. A vertex is said to be incident to those edges that 
have it as an end-point. Two vertices are adjacent if they are incident to the same edge. The degree 
of a vertex is the number of edges it is incident to. To aid the reader in interpreting them, graphs are 
often represented by diagrams. This is normally done by drawing the vertices as dots or circles and 
the edges as lines that connect them. 
 As an example of a graph, let G1 = (V, E), where V = {a, b, c} and E = {{a, b}, {b, c}, {c, 
a}}. This is the graph that would normally be represented by a triangle (see figure 1). It consists of 
three vertices and three edges, such that each pair of vertices are connected by an edge. 
 The main graph-theoretic property that we will be interested is that of isomorphisms.  Two 
graphs are said to be isomorphic if they have the same basic structure, regardless of how different 
their representations may look. More formally, let G = (V, E) and G' = (V', E'). G and G' are 
isomorphic if there exists a bijection I9ĺ9
ZLWKxy (ļI(x)I(y)  E', for all x, y  V. Hence 
isomorphisms are edge-preserving. Note that two graphs can be isomorphic even if their vertices 
have completely different labels.  
 If the above bijection maps a graph to itself, it is an automorphism. It is easy to see that all 
graphs have at least one automorphism- the trivial automorphism. This is the bijection that maps 
every vertex to itself and leaves the edges unchanged. Due to its trivial status, this is regarded as 
uninteresting. If there is a non-trivial automorphism of a graph, then the graph is symmetric. If there 
are no such non-trivial automorphisms, the graph is asymmetric. The graph G1, given as our earlier 
example, is symmetric. It has five non-trivial automorphisms: rotating the diagram clockwise by 
120 and 240 degrees visually represents two of these; the other three correspond to the three 
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reflections of an equilateral triangle. As a point of interest, the smallest asymmetric graphs (other 
than the trivial graph of a single vertex) have six vertices; there are no smaller ones. An example of 
an asymmetric graph is given in figure 2. 
 A note regarding the above definitions: Ladyman and Leitgeb avoid describing the issue in 
set theoretic terms, whereas De Clercq chooses to set up the problem via these standard definitions. 
There is certainly a thorny issue here regarding how best to understand the nature of graphs and 
whether they are, in some fundamental way, set theoretic. While I have no desire to attempt to settle 
this matter hereLWLV'H&OHUFT¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW,VKDOOEHFULWLFLVLQJDQGVRLQWKHVSLULWRIFKDULW\LW
is his framing of the issue that I will adopt. 
 Fortunately, the objection raised in Leitgeb and Ladyman has a straightforward equivalent if 
graphs are indeed set theoretic. The vertices of a graph, as elements of a set, must possess their 
identities regardless of whether the PII holds within graph theory (whether this identity is primitive 
or not is another matter). But we can still ask whether there are any graph theoretic properties that 
will discern the vertices. If there are no such properties in the language of graph theory, then the PII 
fails within that particular mathematical domain.5 
The proposed graph-theoretic counterexamples that I wish to consider are discussed in 
Ladyman (2007), and Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008). Before giving them, however, something 
should be said regarding an initial point that Ladyman makes. Let a labelled graph be a graph in 
which vertices are assigned linguistic labels.6 Then the claim is that labelled graphs cannot give us 
counterexamples to the PII, as every vertex is distinguishable by means of reference to its label, no 
matter what the graph is like. Assigning names to what might otherwise be indistinguishable objects 
is thought to be problematic in the case of Black's spheres (otherwise its status as a putative 
counterexample would be easily dismissed), as using it to fix identity appears to beg the question. 
Ladyman (2007, 33) tells us that the use of labels in graph theory is assumed to be possible, 
marking a difference between the two cases. I assume that he believes this because of the practices 
of mathematicians. 
 Even if we do not adopt the set-theoretic construal of graph theory, this point strikes me as 
only partially true. That mathematicians assign labels to vertices without first checking for 
discernibility tells us little about the metaphysical status of vertices and labels. Instead, it may 
reveal that many working mathematicians care little for this sort of philosophical puzzle. The very 
fact that labels can be assigned to vertices does not reveal whether the identities of the vertices must 
be fixed before labels can be applied or not. It is consistent with mathematical practice that some 
means of discerning the vertices is available before labels are assigned.  
 Returning to the set-theoretic construal, using labelled graphs will not trivialise the PII. 
Properties like being the vertex a have already been ruled out due to the fact that differing with 
respect to them is nothing more than differing numerically. That they are object-involving is further 
reason to be suspicious of them. The mere fact that vertices are assigned names in labelled graphs 
does not mean that we are thereby obliged to accept a form of the PII which takes object-involving 
properties to be permissible. In what follows, I shall therefore be discussing the graph-theoretic 
counterexamples using labelled graphs; more on unlabelled graphs will be said in the next section. 
 Let us now consider the counterexamples (Ib., 34-35). Let G3 = (V3, E3), where V3 = {a, b} 
and E3 = {{a, b}}. This is the graph of two vertices connected by an edge (see figure 3). In fact, this 
is the graph corresponding to the usual putative counterexamples to the PII, such as Black's spheres. 
The two vertices, being connected by an edge, are weakly discernible from one another. Now 
consider G4 = (V4, E4), where V4 = {a, b} and E4 = {}. This is the graph consisting of two vertices 
and no edges- we can get G4 by deleting the edge from G3 (see figure 4). 
 Both G3 and G4 are symmetric graphs: permuting the vertices gives rise to a non-trivial 
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6
 This talk of vertices having labels is somewhat misleading: if we take seriously the graph theoretic definitions, then 
the vertices simply are elements of the vertex set such as a, b and c; there is no need to assign further labels to them. 
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automorphism. In the case of the former, the presence of an edge allows us to weakly discern the 
vertices. However, there does not appear to be any way of discerning the vertices in G4. There are 
no edges and we have already seen that labels alone cannot be used to distinguish them. There does 
not appear to be any other way in which this might be done. As Ladyman points out, G4 is hardly 
unique in this respect- it is very easy to find other graphs that do not have the required relations to 
discern all of their vertices. One other example would be G5 = (V5, E5), where V5 = {a, b, c, d} and 
E5 = {{a, b}, {c, d}}. This is the graph of two unconnected components, each one isomorphic to G3 
(see figure 5). Yet the two components are not discernible, for there are no relations between them 
to ground the discernibility. 
 The obvious conclusion from this is that the PII fails to apply generally in graph theory. 
Ladyman takes this to mean that identity here should be ungrounded- that is, primitive (Ib., 36-37). 
 
3. De Clercq's Defence of the PII 
 
De Clercq attempts to save the PII in graph theory through a distinction between intrastructural 
properties and relations (those that can be found in a particular graph) and interstructural ones 
(those that can be found holding between graphs). The crucial question then is whether we are 
restricted to the former, or whether we can appeal to any non-trivialising graph-theoretic relations. 
He believes that we ought to be less restrictive and hence the PII is preserved: we can discern 
vertices via the properties they have in other graphs. 
 We have already seen that allowing only intrastructural properties will cause the PII to fail; 
simply recall the graph in figure 4 that Ladyman raises as a counterexample. There are no properties 
within that graph that will allow us to discern the vertices, even if we allow for weak discernibility. 
As De Clercq notes, the PII could be read as being more or less restrictive. Since the more 
restrictive version fails, let us consider the more inclusive reading. 
 We need to examine the consequences of allowing for intergraph relations. De Clercq's 
proposal is, in short, that two vertices might satisfy the PII because they bear different relations in 
different graphs. For this to work, of course, it must be possible for a vertex to have cross-graph 
identity. Exactly how this is possible is a related, but separate, issue. Unfortunately, I know of no 
detailed philosophical or mathematical account of this. However, since mathematicians do talk as if 
it is possible, let us merely note that, eventually, the details ought to be fleshed out if one was to 
accept De Clercq's defence. 
 Recall graph G4 given in figure 4. It will be instructive to use this in an example of how De 
Clercq's proposal works. The graph consists of two vertices, a and b, which also appear in graphs 
like G6 = (V6, E6), where V6 = {a, b, c} and E6 = {{a, c}} (see figure 6). In G6, a and b are 
absolutely discernible from one another (although a is not absolutely discernible from c). The two 
vertices bear different properties: for example, vertex b is such that it is an isolated vertex, while 
vertex a is not. So the vertices are not counterexamples to the PII in G6. Since we have shown that 
they are discernible within graph theory generally, and they also appear in G4, a and b are not 
counterexamples in G4 (even though we lack a way of discerning them in G4). 
 The method is simple, but one might worry that it only works for labelled graphs. Without 
labels attached, there does not appear to be a way of finding which vertices feature in which graphs. 
Worse, there might simply be no fact of the matter as to when cross-graph identity occurs. Was 
Ladyman right to focus on unlabelled graphs when seeking counterexamples? 
 De Clercq's response to this is to point out that this relies on unlabelled graphs actually 
being graphs. He provides strong evidence that many graph theorists believe unlabelled graphs are, 
more strictly speaking, isomorphism classes of graphs. Unlabelled graph diagrams are then attempts 
at representing those members of the associated isomorphism class independently of their labels. 
Cross-graph identity of unlabelled vertices cannot be an issue for this interpretation as, again strictly 
speaking, there are no such objects in need of distinctness. 
 Consider again the graph G4 in figure 4, but disregard the labels. This does not constitute a 
counterexample to the PII because it is actually a representation of an isomorphism class that 
  
contains the labelled graph G4 as an element. We have already seen how the vertices a and b in G4 
are can be discerned within graph theory. Hence the PII is saved. 
 It is worth emphasising at this juncture exactly what the putative counterexamples are taken 
to be. Ladyman takes them to be found in the unlabelled graphs due to concerns that labelled 
vertices can be distinguished by appeal to their labels. I follow De Clercq in not taking unlabelled 
graphs to actually be graphs at all, hence they cannot be counterexamples to the PII. We need not 
worry about labelled graphs introducing names that will trivialise the PII since the version we are 
interested in counts such properties as impermissible. Therefore any counterexamples will be found 
in the labelled graphs. 
 
4. The Problem of Unrestricted Graphs 
 
De Clercq's defence of the PII using intergraph relations is a very interesting one, but it faces a 
problem in its details. To tease this out, let us consider exactly how vertices like b are supposed to 
be discerned. Recall that the suggestion is that they are absolutely discernible on account of graphs 
like G6. To begin with, take the property is isolated in another graph. Vertex b has this property on 
account of its position in G6, where b is isolated, whereas vertex a is not isolated in G6. The 
property is not trivialising, makes no appeal to object names and is of the right form to absolutely 
discern a vertex. 
 Yet this property will not save the PII. The problem is that this property will not uniquely 
pick out vertex b. For every graph G6, there is a corresponding graph G7 = (V7, E7), where V7 = {a, 
b, c} and E7 = {{b, c}} (see figure 7). This is just the graph resulting from swapping a and b around 
in G6. But while b is isolated in G6, it is a which is isolated in G7. So both vertices bear the property 
is isolated in another graph. Hence this property will not absolutely discern them. 
 Of course, the problem is not specific to these graphs. Take any graph in which a has some 
property that b does not and permute the vertices. We now have a graph in which it is b which has 
this property while a does not. A natural thought here is that this problem only arises because the 
property above was poorly chosen. In particular, it says nothing about which other graph the vertex 
is isolated in. A more specific property may fare better. 
 The most specific non-object-involving property would be is isolated in a graph with three 
vertices and an edge between two of them. As an aside, the non-reductive nature of the PII we are 
considering is clear here: this property is non-trivialising despite being identity-involving on 
account of its appeal to a particular number of distinct vertices. Yet even this property will not 
absolutely discern vertices a and b. The problem is the same as before: both vertices bear the 
property since it describes both G6 and G7. 
 In order to avoid the problem posed to De Clercq by the plurality of graphs, the property 
appealed to must be specific enough to single out a single graph. A property like is isolated in a 
graph with vertices a, b and c, and an edge between b and c would do this by completely describing 
the relevant graph. However, in order to do this, it must utilise object names which, following 
Muller, were banned in the first section. 
 While this ban was motivated by appeal to the equivalence of weak discernibility in a 
language without object names to all forms of discernibility in a language with names, a defender of 
De Clercq might try to run the argument the other way. That is, the existence of object-involving 
properties like the previous one entails the existence of an acceptable weakly discerning relation 
that does not make use of object names. 
 But such a relation has not yet been provided. And neither can I see what it might be. The 
EXUGHQRISURRIKHUHOLHVXSRQ'H&OHUFT¶VDFFRXQWto offer a relation for consideration. Only at that 
point will we be in a position to tell whether it truly is trivialising or not. 
 As an alternative way of narrowing the number of graphs under consideration, we might 
note the similarity between interstructural properties and modal ones. Both are concerned with how 
an object features in contexts other than the actual one. Perhaps this might be expanded upon to 
give us the required account. In particular, the notion of the closest possible world has proven itself 
  
to be a useful one ± the analogue would be of the closest graph. 
 For this to work, there would need to be some way of determining how close one graph is to 
another. This, at least, does loRNSRVVLEOH(UGĘVDQG5pQ\L (1963) use the notion of the degree of 
asymmetry of a graph: this is the number of 'moves' it takes to turn an asymmetric graph into a 
symmetric one. By 'move' I mean the graph theoretic operations of addition or deletion of an edge. 
While they then go on to prove several interesting facts, the details do not concern us here. The 
important point is that it is easy to see how a parallel notion to a graph's degree of asymmetry might 
help De Clercq. Let the degree of difference of a graph G relative to a graph G' be the minimum 
number of edges and vertices that must be added or deleted to transform G into G'. We can then say 
that one graph is closer to G than another if its degree of difference is lower. Then we could 
interpret De Clercq's method as considering only the closest graphs to our problematic ones. 
 Setting aside the issue of justification for the moment (as noting that there is a possible 
analogy is hardly sufficient), we must ask whether this method will do what it is needed to. 
Unfortunately, the answer is that it will not. Consider G4, G6 and G7 once more (figures 4, 6 and 7 
respectively). The degree of difference of G6 relative to G4 is 1. But the degree of difference of G7 
relative to G4 is also 1. While this suggestion will restrict those graphs that can be considered, it is 
not restrictive enough: for any degree of difference, there will be many graphs that have that value 
relative to G4. Nor is there any sense in looking for graphs with a lower degree of difference than 1. 
Clearly the degree of difference must be a positive integer, or 0. But the only graphs with a degree 
of difference relative to G4 of 0 are those isomorphic to it, in which case the problem of 
discernibility will still arise. 
 Hence we must conclude that this defence will not succeed, despite the analogy. In the 
absence of any other defence being offered or of any weakly discerning relations being found, it is 
reasonable to conclude that De Clercq's method will not save the PII in graph theory. Further, the 
current lack of any account of cross-graph identity that does not beg the question makes the 
prospects of a defence reliant on inter-graph properties dim at best.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